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Abstract: The paper examines the analysis of the fundamental structure of 
consciousness as developed in Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta philosophy, and 
compares this highly influential Indian view with a predominant analysis in the 
Western tradition, viz., the Phenomenological theory of consciousness developed 
by Brentano and Husserl. According to the Phenomenological account, all mental 
states are intentional, and hence consciousness must always be directed toward 
some object. In sharp contrast, Śaṅkara holds pure, undirected consciousness to be 
fundamental, while consciousness of a particular object is a secondary mode. In 
expositing the contrast between these two accounts, I draw on deep structural 
parallels that characterize the Newtonian versus Leibnizean theories of physical 
space. Śaṅkara's notion of pure consciousness is highly analogous to the classical 
Newtonian conception of absolute space, and this conception provides a powerful 
and illuminating model of the Indian view. In contrast, Husserl’s notion of 
intentional consciousness closely parallels the Leibnizean relational account of 
physical space. 
 
                                               1. Introduction 
Perhaps the most striking difference between the predominant Indian analysis of 
consciousness and that prevalent in the West concerns whether consciousness, as such, 
can exist without an object. The highly influential analysis defended by the Vedāntic 
philosopher Śaṅkara maintains that pure consciousness itself is not dependent on any 
specific content or thing towards which it is directed. Instead, consciousness is 
ontologically autonomous, while consciousness of an object is a secondary and dependent 
mode. In sharp contrast, the phenomenological tradition of Western philosophy maintains 
that all mental states, by their very nature, must be directed towards something, and hence 
pure, non-intentional consciousness is ruled out as theoretically impossible. 
 In the present paper, I explore the Indian notion of autonomous consciousness, 
and present it as a profound conceptual alternative to the Western phenomenological 
view.  In expositing the contrast between these two accounts, I will draw on striking 
parallels that characterize another very different, yet highly analogous divergence that 
occurs purely within the Western theoretical tradition – that between Newton and Leibniz 
concerning the ultimate nature of physical space. The Newtonian conception of ‘absolute’ 
or ‘substantival’ space is in many ways comparable to Śaṅkara's notion of autonomous 
consciousness, while the Leibnizean view of ‘relational’ space closely parallels the 
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Phenomenological stand on the intentionality of consciousness. So the contrast between 
these two competing theories of physical space will be used to develop and illuminate the 
salient contrasting views on the fundamental structure of consciousness.  
      
                                       2. Absolute Consciousness 
          
The first step in the discussion will be an exposition of the Indian stance on pure 
consciousness. I will take Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta philosophy as providing the 
‘canonical’ expression of this view, but will also appeal to the allied notion of 
consciousness developed in the Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition. The history of Indian philosophy 
has been dynamically shaped by the longstanding controversies within Hinduism between 
its six rival schools or darśanas, and additionally between orthodox Hinduism and the 
two heterodox schools of Buddhism and Jainism. On the topic of consciousness, one of 
the traditional issues of controversy revolved around the question of whether or not 
consciousness, by its essential nature, must be of an object. In the conventional 
terminology of disputation, this is the question of whether it is saviṣayaka or nirviṣayaka, 
i.e. intrinsically intentional or not. In addition the debate concerned the issue: does 
consciousness belong to someone ‒ does it have a ‘place’, or is it ‘placeless’, belonging to 
no one? In disputational terms, is it āśraya or nirāśraya? 
 According to Śaṅkara, consciousness is both nirviṣayaka and nirāśraya, 
ultimately both non-intentional and belonging to no one. This quite distinctive stand on 
consciousness is intimately related to his monistic metaphysical view. Put somewhat 
roughly, Śaṅkara holds that pure consciousness is the fundamental reality. Unconditioned 
awareness or cit is the one basic substance. And if pure consciousness is the fundamental 
reality, then it is not dependent upon anything else for its existence. On the contrary, 
everything else that seems to exist is metaphysically dependent upon consciousness. In 
this sense Śaṅkara's view is akin to various forms of Western idealism, though it would 
be misleading to attribute to him the view that reality is fundamentally mental in nature. 
For Śaṅkara, the mind itself is not to be identified with pure consciousness or cit, and as 
noted above, he maintains that consciousness is nirāśraya, it has no place and belongs to 
no one. And hence it belongs to no particular mind. 
 In this regard it is worth comparing Śaṅkara's notion of consciousness with a 
closely related view developed in the Sāṅkhya-Yoga tradition of orthodox Hinduism. 
Both positions share a conception of absolute consciousness, though in contrast to 
Advaita (i.e. non-dualistic) Vedānta, the Sāṅkhya-Yoga school advocates a dualistic 
metaphysics. According to this tradition, there are two basic substances in the 
metaphysical firmament, pure consciousness, or puruṣa (in Sāṅkhya terminology) and 
prakṛti or matter. Thus Sāṅkhya-Yoga thought advocates a basic duality between 
consciousness and material substance, and unlike the monistic Advaita Vedānta, it holds 
matter to be ontologically autonomous and distinct from puruṣa.  
 And just as Śaṅkara's consciousness monism is crucially distinct from Western 
idealistic views, so too is the dualistic Sāṅkhya-Yoga position conceptually removed from 
the classical Cartesian dualism between mind and matter. Unlike the Cartesian model that 
has so deeply pervaded and influenced contemporary Western thought, the Sāṅkhya-Yoga 
school does not advocate a schism between mind and matter, since it places mind on the 
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material side of the ontological divide. Instead, a dualism between mind and 
consciousness is embraced. So in common with Śaṅkara, and in contrast with both 
Berkeley’s idealism and Descartes’ dualism, the Sāṅkhya-Yoga view detaches 
consciousness from mind, and places the metaphysical emphasis on the former rather than 
the latter. 
 As with Śaṅkara's notion of pure consciousness or cit, according to the Sāṅkhya-
Yoga view, puruṣa is characterized as absolute and unconditioned awareness, and it is 
held to be immutable and inactive, to be formless and without limiting characteristics. 
Movement and form are attributes of matter, and they are also attributes of thought, which 
is a manifestation of matter. In stark contrast, pure consciousness is intrinsically formless 
and unchanging. The cognitive processes that characterize the mind are governed by the 
unconscious and mechanical forces of the material realm, and to this extent mental 
phenomena are viewed in purely naturalistic terms. The unfolding of thought forms is an 
integral part of the evolution of prakṛti, and mental processes are simply the result of 
appropriate transformations of unconscious material substance.  
 It is perhaps worth noting at this point that the Sāṅkhya-Yoga view thereby avoids 
one of the most serious pitfalls of Cartesian dualism, since on the Indian account, mental 
causation does not violate any physical conservation laws. By including mind in the realm 
of matter, mental events are granted causal efficacy, and are thereby able to directly 
initiate bodily motions. And, conversely, material objects are able to have genuine mental 
effects, as required by normal accounts of, say, the flow of information involved in 
perceptual awareness of the environment. The representational content of sensory 
experiences, such as those which attend perceiving the blueness of the sky or the pungent 
flavor of espresso, can now be treated as straightforward consequences of the physical 
environment's causal impingements upon the mind. This is because, in contrast to 
standard Western dualism, there is no longer a causal/ontological gulf separating mind 
from matter.
1 
 But what then is the relationship between consciousness and matter, and in 
particular, between consciousness and mind ‒ how are conscious mental events made 
possible? On the Sāṅkhya-Yoga model, thought processes and mental events are 
conscious only to the extent that they receive external ‘illumination’ from puruṣa. Pure 
consciousness is standardly compared to a light, which illuminates the particular material 
configurations or ‘shapes’ assumed by the mind. The term ‘manas’ is often translated 
directly as ‘mind’, although it is more accurate to observe that it is the combination of 
both manas and buddhi which roughly corresponds to the objective or impersonal mental 
faculties in Western philosophical discourse, and, as will be exposited below, it is buddhi 
which is centrally involved in the occurrence of conscious experience. 
     Manas is viewed essentially as an organ, the special organ of cognition, just as the 
eyes are the special organs of sight. Indeed, manas is held to be intimately connected with 
perception, since the raw data supplied by the senses must be ordered and categorized 
with respect to a conceptual/linguistic scheme before various objects can be perceived as 
members of their respective categories, and as inhabiting a world characterized by the 
systematic and distinguishable attributes with which sense experience is normally 
imbued. This imposition of conceptual/linguistic structure on the field of raw sensation is 
one of the basal activities of manas, and forms the distinction between brute sensation 
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(nirvikalpaka) as opposed to differentiated perception (savikalpaka). In addition to its 
perceptual activities, manas is held to be responsible for the cognitive functions of 
analysis, deliberation and decision. It is closely allied to buddhi, which is somewhat 
roughly translated as the faculty of ‘intellect’ or ‘reason’. Buddhi is a subtler and more 
powerful faculty than manas, and is responsible for higher level intellectual functions, 
which require intuition, insight and reflection. The Indian buddhi is in some ways 
comparable to the Greek noûs, while manas is responsible for lower level discursive 
thought and analysis. But buddhi is still regarded as a manifestation of prakṛti, albeit the 
most subtle and refined form which material substance can assume.  
 Now, to return to the interplay of consciousness and matter, resulting in 
apparently conscious mental events. It is the subtle ‘thought forms’ of the buddhi which 
allow mental events to appear conscious, because the refined buddhi substance is held to 
be ‘transparent’ to the light of consciousness. Thus conscious thoughts and perceptual 
experiences take place when buddhi receives representational forms, both perceptual and 
conceptual, from manas, the ‘organ of cognition’. So buddhi receives cognitive structures 
from manas, and conscious ‘light’ from puruṣa, and in this manner specific mental 
structures are illuminated by an external source and thereby appear conscious.
2
  
 To fully exploit the optical analogy, the conscious representational structures 
involved in, say, visual perception, can be compared to transparent photographic slides. 
The photographic image stored in the film is composed of matter, but it is both 
representational and translucent. Therefore, when the film is held up to an external light 
source, such as the sun, the illuminated representation is analogous to the structures of 
perceptual experience which glow with the sentience of puruṣa. Only the subtle thought-
forms of buddhi are transluscent with the light of puruṣa, while other configurations of 
matter are opaque to this radiance. And this is why minds appear to be the loci of 
sentience in the physical world, while stones and tables cannot assume conscious guise.
3
  
         Though non-dualistic, Śaṅkara's Advaita philosophy shares many of the same ideas 
as the Sāṅkhya-Yoga model just described. Śaṅkara accepts a similar interaction between 
manas and buddhi, and likewise views the mind as a material configuration ultimately 
devoid of consciousness. It merely appears conscious because of the external source of 
illumination. The main difference is that the physical world is not held to be 
metaphysically independent by Śaṅkara, but rather to be ultimately an ‘illusion’ sustained 
by māyā. Yet, regardless of their disagreement about the fundamental status of matter, 
Sāṅkhya-Yoga dualism and Advaita monism both share a similar conception of absolute 
consciousness as an autonomous substance, essentially separable from the vicissitudes 
and limitations of the particular minds to which it appears to belong. For both Śaṅkara 
and Sāṅkhya-Yoga, pure consciousness is immutable and inactive, formless and without 
limiting characteristics.  
 Pure consciousness illuminates the material thought-forms of the buddhi, thereby 
yielding the appearance of sentient states that are directed towards particular objects and 
cognitive contents. But from the perspective of pure consciousness this directedness is 
merely an appearance. Consciousness as such is not directed towards these objects, it has 
no intention to illuminate the limited material structures in question, and it is completely 
independent of the mental phenomena upon which its light happens to fall. As exposited 
by Karl Potter,  
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 … whereas ordinary awareness not only has an object but also requires it as the 
 occasion for that specific piece of awareness or judgment, pure consciousness has 
 no more relation to its objects than does the sun that shines on everything without 
 being in the least affected by or dependent on things. (1981, p. 93). 
 
Potter thus appeals to sunlight as a suitable model of the non-intentional nature of pure 
consciousness. But an even more fitting analogy is introduced in the following passage 
from Śaṅkara (from the verse section of his work Upadeśasāhasrī, chapter 10, 'On the 
Nature of Consciousness'), which begins with the use of light and progresses to a 
comparison with space: 
 Pure and changeless consciousness I am by nature, devoid of objects to illumine… 
 Beginningless and devoid of attributes, I have neither actions nor their results… 
 Though in a body, I do not get attached on account of my subtleness, like space  
which, though all pervading, does not get tainted. 
 
Indeed, space provides an extremely apt  analogy when trying to address the conceptual 
question of ‘how is pure consciousness itself to be understood ‒ what would provide an 
appropriate structural model for such a phenomenon?’ And the highly abstract notion of 
physical space supplies a fascinating answer. To the ancient Greek classification of the 
world as consisting of the four ultimate components of earth, water, fire and air, the 
Indians added a fifth and all pervasive element: ākāśa, which is more or less equivalent to 
classical ‘ether’ or ‘space’. As a basic metaphysical substance, pure consciousness is held 
to possess several essential features in common with this most subtle, and in some 
respects most fundamental, of the physical elements. 
 Consciousness, like space, is ontologically independent of the objects that may 
happen to fill or occupy it. Thus consciousness of an object is a secondary, non-
fundamental mode, analogous to space that is occupied. In normal circumstances, we are 
mostly concerned with and cognizant of space with things in it, and this can hide the fact 
that space itself is not ontologically dependent on its occupants. Similarly, in normal 
circumstances we are mostly concerned with the field of consciousness only insofar as it 
is directed towards particular things and contents, insofar as it has an intentional object. 
And, according to the Indian view, this can obscure the fact that pure consciousness itself 
does not depend on the things that we happen to be conscious of. 
 Another related aspect in which consciousness is held to resemble space is that, in 
addition to being ontologically self-sustaining, space cannot, even in principle, be affected 
by the objects which fill it. Space itself remains detached and unalterable, even when 
there are things ‘taking it up’. Space is totally inert ‒ it cannot be displaced or disturbed, 
and it does not react in any way with its contents. This is very much in contrast to air, for 
example. Objects occupying a place in the atmosphere must displace the fluid that would 
otherwise occupy the same spatial location. And objects moving through a gaseous 
medium cause turbulence and friction, propagate sound waves and generate heat. The 
atmosphere will chemically interact with the surface of these objects, resulting in 
corrosion and weathering, etc. 
 In contrast space is absolutely detached, passive and inert. Space cannot be 
touched or altered by the things that fill it. And conversely, space cannot affect its 
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occupants. So it is significant that this highly abstract notion of ākāśa or space, rather 
than air, is used as the structural metaphor for consciousness. Clearly, the Indian notion of 
ākāśa is in many ways comparable to the Newtonian conception of absolute space, and 
hence on this view, consciousness itself is structurally analogous to Newton’s classical 
conception of space as an independently real, objective and fundamentally detached 
manifold. 
 
                         3. Newtonian versus Leibnizean Conceptions of Space 
 
As the next stage in the discussion, I will now give a brief exposition of the notion of 
absolute space in physical theory, and explore some of the close structural parallels with 
the foregoing notion of absolute consciousness.
4
  As is well known, Newton and his 
followers advocated a ‘substantivalist’ line on physical space, where space itself is 
postulated as a kind of substance, with an independent reality and structure. In particular, 
the reality and structure of space are held to be independent of the existence or non-
existence of the more mundane physical objects that might occupy it. Even if there were 
no matter in the universe at all, there would still be space with its standard three-
dimensional Euclidean metric.  
 On the Newtonian view, space is infinite in extension, and it persists infinitely 
through time. And, unlike other material substances, its persistence through time is 
characterized by the fact that it is totally unchanging. Regardless of bodies located in 
space, undergoing accelerations, and other physical events and interactions taking place in 
the spatial ‘arena’, the elusive substance itself is completely unaffected. Objects are 
located ‘in’ space, but this occupation leaves no trace and makes no difference, even 
while it is taking place. The relation between material objects and substantival space is 
often couched in terms of this `containment’ metaphor, resulting in the view that objects 
are ‘in’ space like furniture is in a room. But this simplistic container model is fairly 
limited, since space is not defined by encompassing boundaries as rooms are. More 
precisely, an ordinary extended object can be thought of as ‘in’ space in the sense that it is 
coincident with a relevant set of points of the substantive manifold. 
      In opposition to the Newtonian camp, Leibniz and his followers put forward an 
alternative and rather deflationary account. They deny that space, as such, has any 
independent reality. The only things that properly exist are material entities and physical 
events. All spatial assertions should be interpreted not as attributing features to space 
itself, but rather as attributing spatial relations between material existents. So objects 
‘occupy’ space only to the extent that they bear the salient geometrical relations to other 
bodies and to subparts of themselves as extended objects. To posit an independent 
structure of space, over and above the spatial relations that obtain between idealized point 
material objects, is to indulge in unnecessary metaphysical reification. Idealized point 
objects can bear spatial relations to one another without there being an extraneous entity, 
‘absolute space’ that objectifies these relationships. According to Leibniz (1716), 
I hold space to be something merely relative, as time is; that is, I hold it to be an              
order of coexistences, as time is an order of successions. For space denotes, in  
terms of possibility, an order of things which exist at the same time, considered as  
existing together, without inquiring into their manner of existing. 
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Leibniz speaks of space as a family of relations considered ‘in terms of possibility’ in 
order to make sense of the ordinary notion of unoccupied space. This notion represents a 
potential problem for the relationist, since in the case of empty space, there are no objects 
to be related. One solution would be to deny the basic possibility of unoccupied positions, 
which is the source of a rather misplaced scepticism in the history of science, concerning 
the possibility of a genuine vacuum. Leibniz’s more subtle alternative is to endorse 
possible but nonactual spatial relations, where talk of empty space is interpreted in the 
subjunctive mode. So to make assertions about empty space in a container is to make 
claims about what spatial relations point material objects would have, if they were located 
inside the container.  
 In turn, it has been objected by substantivalists that this introduction of 
subjunctive discourse is ungrounded, without appeal to an underlying nonsubjunctive 
theory of ‘real’ space. How can one invoke possible but non-actual spatial relations, 
unless this is based on a tacit appeal to some underlying matter of fact concerning the 
objective structure of space? For example, the dispositional property of being soluble can 
be expressed subjunctively as ‘would dissolve if it were immersed in water’, but this 
subjunctive claim is based on appeal to facts about the actual microstructural properties 
involved – it is not a ‘bottom level’ claim of the theory.  
 In terms of the structural symmetry between theories of consciousness and 
theories of space, the phenomenologist is not normally faced with a similar difficulty, 
since there is not a generally felt need to explain pure undirected awareness – indeed, 
such states would typically be denied as impossible, in much the same way that the 
possibility of a genuine vacuum was denied by some proponents of the relational view. 
And a polemical analogy also occurs with respect to the foregoing substantivalist’s 
objection to Leibniz’s more subtle move. If it is held that subjunctive claims about 
unoccupied space must be grounded on an underlying theory of the objective nature of 
real space, then it follows that the substantivalist must hold that the actual structure of 
space is a necessary precondition for an adequate account of space that is occupied. And 
as will be seen in a subsequent section, this closely parallels the Indian claim that absolute 
consciousness is a necessary precondition for normal conscious states that are directed 
towards particular contents or objects.  
 
 
                                  5. The Phenomenological View of Consciousness 
 
As noted before, according to the Phenomenological account, consciousness is essentially 
intentional ‒ conscious states are always of or about something (although this 
‘something’ may well be a non-existent object, such as Pegasus or Meinong's ‘Golden 
Mountain’). And this is closely analogous to the Leibnizean spatial doctrine outlined 
above. As in the Leibnizean notion of relational space, there is no provision for a 
substantive or real structure, over and above conscious states that are directed, i.e., that 
are determined by the relation of subject to object. Husserl’s analysis stems from his 
modification and development of the notion of intentionality as revived by his teacher 
Franz Brentano, who adopted the notion as a basic criterion for distinguishing properly 
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mental from purely physical phenomena. And for Brentano as well, consciousness is 
viewed as essentially intentional, so that the very notion of consciousness without an 
object is seen as self-contradictory.  
 Thus the Phenomenological stance on the intentionality of consciousness is in 
opposition to the Indian analysis on two major points. First, the latter claims that the mind 
and the processes by which it is directed to external objects are essentially physical in 
nature, while Brentano uses directedness as the key feature distinguishing minds from 
mere physical systems. Second, Śaṅkara holds that, far from being self-contradictory, 
consciousness without an object is indeed fundamental, while directed states of awareness 
comprise a secondary and dependent mode. In contrast, Husserl maintains that there is an 
indissoluble link between consciousness and ‘meaning’, where this meaning encompasses 
both the semantical directedness of Frege’s Sinn, which does the essential work of 
linguistic reference, as well as a perceptual form of directedness to account for conscious 
experiences of, for example, the-tree-as-perceived, i.e. as seen from a particular 
perspective on a particular occasion. In phenomenological terminology, it is the noema 
which comprises this structured mode of presentation inherent in all episodes of 
consciousness.  
 Husserl’s position is notoriously intricate and complex, and in the following 
discussion I will rely heavily on Aron Gurwitsch’s (1982) elucidation. Regarding 
Husserl’s stance on the intentionality of consciousness, Gurwitsch states that  
It pertains to the essential nature of acts of consciousness to be related and  
correspond to noemata… consciousness must be defined as a noetic-noematic  
correlation, that is to say, a correlation between items pertaining to two  
heterogeneous planes: on the one hand the plane of temporal psychological events,  
and on the other hand that of… ideal entities that are the noemata, or meanings  
understood in the broader sense [his italics] (p. 65). 
Indeed, according to Gurwitsch, consciousness is then to be characterized by an intrinsic 
duality between psychological events and the correlated ideal objects, where this duality 
takes the place of Descartes’ schism between thinking substance and extended substance. 
      Of course, the Indian theory of consciousness must also make provision for the 
directedness of ordinary mental states, and as will be seen below, it does this in a very 
literal fashion. However, the Indian view diverges from the Phenomenological analysis 
with respect to the fundamental status of these ordinary states. It argues that the more 
basic absolute consciousness is a necessary precondition for these directed states, if they 
are to appear conscious. Conversely, if these directed states are taken on their own, they 
remain both unconscious and purely material. But, as the following section will maintain, 
in spite of their extreme differences, there is still far wider scope for agreement between 
the two frameworks than might first be suspected. 
 
                      6. The Vedāntic/Sāṅkhya-Yoga Theory of Intentional States 
 
According to Śaṅkara, pure unconditioned awareness, as such, must be distinguished 
from the particular ‘states of consciousness’ associated with individual agents at specific 
times. Though the underlying story is quite different, these states of consciousness are 
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meant to capture the same basic set of phenomena as that which Gurwitsch calls ‘acts of 
consciousness’, viz., particular instances of directed conscious experience.  
 In marked contrast to the contemporary Western stance, Vedāntic philosophy 
takes an extremely non-metaphorical approach to intentionality. The paradigmatic case is 
sense perception, where the mind is said to literally ‘go out’ (prāpya-kārī, Indich 1980, p. 
71) through the sense organs into the world and ‘assume the form’ of the objects of 
perception and knowledge. Thus intentional directedness is founded on a veritable ‘noetic 
ray’ (normally described as ‘of the nature of light’, or tejas), which itself makes actual 
contact with the external objects on which the mind is focussed. When the mind thus 
assimilates the form of its external object, this results in an appropriate modification of 
manas, the organ of cognition. This modification of manas, this structural reflection or 
mental likeness, then becomes manifest in the buddhi substance and is illuminated by 
pure consciousness, thus resulting in a particular directed conscious state.  
 So a conscious state of an individual agent, directed towards a specific object, is 
treated as a metaphysical hybrid. The properly intentional aspect of this hybrid is seen as 
an alteration of the ‘inner instrument’, viz. a modification of manas effected by its literal 
contact with its respective object, which cognitive modification is then transferred to the 
vitreous buddhi substrate. And this component of the hybrid state is purely mechanical or 
‘naturalistic’, a direct consequence of the causal transformations governing the physical 
domain. In more contemporary raiment, this could be seen as a physically implemented 
formal representation or form of information processing. Then this structural modification 
of the mental substrate, a kind of essentialist representation, is passively illuminated by 
pure consciousness, resulting in a ‘directed’ configuration of matter that appears to be 
sentient. 
 Hence on this account the mind is held to be in motion, and actively extends into 
space, rather than remaining passive in its cognitive container, merely the recipient of 
causal impingements from the outside world. The Vedāntic/Sāṅkhya-Yoga view does not 
posit an ontological gulf separating mind from matter, and thus the mind can actively 
‘pervade’ objects and modify itself in response to the structures it contacts. But obviously 
the mechanical literalness of this traditional Indian theory of intentionality retains a 
serious problem – no such physical force ‘going forth’ from the mind has ever been 
detected. So perhaps the story can be altered slightly, to put it more in line with 
contemporary views of internal representations that are produced by external causal 
forces. On such a view, the mind is impacted by various forms of external stimuli, which 
give rise to internal structures that mirror various key aspects of the external world. These 
internal structures are instantiated as modifications of the material manas, which in turn 
represent salient aspects of the environment. This more contemporary variation of the 
ancient Indian picture possess a significant advantage over Cartesian dualism, because the 
mind is still material and hence can receive physical stimuli from the outside world, and 
undergo appropriate internal modifications, without invoking troublesome interactions 
between disparate substances.  
 As noted earlier in the paper, one of the most serious pitfalls of the Cartesian 
framework resides in the fact that outside impingements from the environment, such as 
sound waves and electromagnetic radiation, can have no real affect on res cogitans, and 
the ideas entertained by thinking substance are hence ontologically and causally detached 
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from their corresponding objects in res extensa. The Vedāntic/Sāṅkhya-Yoga framework 
at least overcomes this huge stumbling block for mental representations, and isolates the 
real problem of consciousness at a more exact and focussed level. Rather than letting the 
problem of consciousness infect the entire mental domain, the representations and 
structural transformations that characterize mental contents and processes are now part of 
the normal time-evolution of the physical universe. Some of these happen to be 
illuminated by an outside, non-physical source of consciousness, which itself does no 
work and does not alter the physical realm in any way. Hence the ancient Indian model 
seemingly endorses a version of epiphenomenal qualia, in striking similarity to 
contemporary positions expressed, for example, by Frank Jackson (1982). 
 In any case, Phenomenological views in particular, and western views in general, 
tend to be highly metaphorical about intentional ‘powers’. The mind is said to be 
‘directed towards’ objects, it has an intentional ‘aim’, etc., but these locutions tend to lack 
explicit force. To be sure, on Husserl’s view, the noema serve as the vehicle by which the 
mind is directed. It is thus the correlation with the salient noema which gives the mind 
intentional access to an external realm. According to Gurwitsch, “… the perceptual 
noema must not be mistaken for an Idea in the Cartesian sense – that is to say, the 
substitute for, or representative of, a reality only mediately accessible” (p. 68). And again, 
“… because of the intentionality of consciousness, we are in direct contact with the 
world” (p. 66). Thus for Husserl, there is a strong attempt to repudiate the Cartesian 
heritage which preconditions so much of western philosophical thought about the mind.  
 According to Gurwitsch, “The temporal events called ‘acts of consciousness’ have 
the peculiarity of being actualizations or apprehensions of meanings, the terms 
‘apprehension’ and ‘meaning’ being understood in a very general sense beyond the 
special case of symbolic expressions” (p. 65). It is certainly worth noting that these 
‘actualizations or apprehensions of meanings’ are highly analogous to the Vedantic 
‘modifications of manas’, where both types of structured event are meant to characterize 
the internal or subjective/mental reality of perceiving and understanding.  
 Indeed, Gurwitsch’s talk of  ‘consciousness’ as a correlation between items from 
different planes, the psychological and the noematic, looks more like the characterization 
of particular, content-laden mental states, rather than a characterization of consciousness 
simplicitor. Apparently both of these correlated items, when taken separately, remain 
unconscious. In this manner, ‘apprehensions of meaning’ and ‘modifications of manas’ 
are reasonably compatible, except that on the Indian model there is only one plane (the 
material) involved. But in terms of intentional structure, and the unconscious status of the 
elements invoked, there is a fair degree of resemblance between the two analyses of 
directed mental states.  
 Both perspectives could still agree that particular mental states with specific 
content or form must, by their very nature, be intentional. To deny this would seem to be 
committing a kind of self contradiction. And Śaṅkara could potentially agree with the 
phenomenologist insofar as the Vedāntin’s pure, autonomous consciousness is not 
properly a mental state. In this regard, all conscious mental states are intentional for 
Śaṅkara as well, because pure consciousness is said to illuminate the ‘directed’ 
modifications of matter intrinsic to such states. 
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 So the critical differences obviously emerge with respect to the status and role of 
pure consciousness. The distinctively phenomenological claim that pure, undirected 
consciousness itself is theoretically impossible seems much less compelling than the 
weaker assertion just delineated, viz., that all conscious mental states must be intentional. 
What are the underlying grounds for this additional claim, and what is the force of the 
‘impossibility’? Indeed, actuality is generally accepted as a proof of possibility, and in the 
final section I will examine some traditional claims regarding the experiential reality of 
pure consciousness.  
 
                                                 7. Mystical Experience 
 
While consciousness has only recently become a serious and reputable topic of discussion 
in mainstream Anglo-American philosophy, it has been one of the primary themes of 
investigation in Indian philosophy for several thousand years. And, in sharp contrast to 
the Western approach of detached analysis and rational speculation, the Indian tradition in 
the investigation of mind and consciousness has always attempted to wed theory and 
practice, so that abstract conceptual accounts evolved in tandem with extremely advanced 
‘internal technologies’ of meditation, consciousness manipulation and related psycho-
physical disciplines. Hence it can reasonably be argued that the Indian tradition has had a 
much richer variety of data with which to work, and a more sustained and versatile 
acquaintance with the phenomenon under investigation.  
 So it is pertinent to note that numerous individuals, particularly in the historical 
past, have reported entering into states of pure, objectless awareness, especially as the 
result of prolonged practice of salient meditational and psycho-physical techniques. And 
indeed, it is these experiences that were used to motivate the philosophical account – they 
constituted crucial facts that needed to be accommodated by an adequate theoretical grasp 
of consciousness. The real nature of consciousness was not thought to follow from mere 
conceptual analysis or rational speculation. Within the conventional framework, absolute 
consciousness cannot be established by mere rational argument alone. Rather it is 
essentially a state of realization, something disclosed only through direct experience. 
 Although this type of experience is admittedly not a datum contained in the 
average personal repertoire of subjectively accessible inner states, the Indian analysis of 
mundane, everyday perceptual consciousness points to a vital similarity. Even in normal, 
unreflective perception, there is a strong non-dualism between the knower and the known. 
In normal consciousness we are not usually aware of ourselves, over and above and 
separate from the objects perceived. There is a deep immediacy in perceptual awareness 
which tends to collapse the apparent separation between subject and object. Indeed, 
Husserl would take this immediacy as indicating that the locus of consciousness is in the 
relation between subject and object. But the Advaitins would take it a step further and say 
that the relation itself actually disappears, and that this is a foreshadowing of the real 
experience of non-duality which is absolute, objectless awareness. 
 
Notes: 
1.This would explain only the properly representational aspects of experience, i.e. 
information about the environment that can be extracted from the field of consciousness. 
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It would still not cross the ‘gap’ and elucidate the uniquely conscious aspect of 
experience, since this is not deemed to be a material phenomenon. 
 
2. But alas, the optical analogy breaks down in the end, since the electromagnetic 
radiation of visible light belongs to the same causal/ontological realm as the matter out of 
which the photographic slide is composed, and this is why the two phenomena can 
interact to produce a luminous image. As usual, the nature of the interaction between 
disparate substances constitutes the Achilles heel of dualistic theories. 
 
3. It is interesting to note in passing that a potential version of panpsychism is thereby 
ruled out. Additionally, in the absence of puruṣa it would be theoretically possible to have 
a ‘philosophical zombie’ i.e. an exact physical replica of a human body and mind that was 
completely devoid of consciousness. The physical replica would nonetheless function 
exactly like a normal human being. For a more detailed discussion of the Sankhya-Yoga 
view see Schweizer (1993). 
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